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English

Derrida’s Debt to Milton Friedman
Michael Tratner

I

n the essay Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, Jacques Derrida says it is
important to trace the literary consequences of certain events in
economic history: “To study, for example, in so-called modern
literature, that is, contemporaneous with capital—city, polis, metropolis—of a state and with a state of capital, the transformation of money
forms (metallic, fiduciary—the bank note—or scriptural—the bank
check), a certain rarification of payments in cash, the recourse to credit
cards, the coded signature, and so forth, in short, a certain dematerialization of money, and therefore of all the scenes that depend on it.”1
The transformation Derrida describes is part of the development of late
capitalism; though his essay analyzes a short story by the nineteenthcentury writer Baudelaire, the transformation away from “metallic” to
“fiduciary” forms of money officially occurred in the twentieth century,
as did the spread of credit cards and coded signatures. As the economic
historian Randall Hinshaw notes, during the twentieth century “commodity money is gradually being displaced by fiduciary money . . . in
1937, gold or commodity money made up about 91% of the world’s
monetary reserves . . . this figure had dropped to 49% in mid-1966.”2 In
other words, fiduciary money became the dominant form of money at
just about the time that Derrida began developing his literary theories.
Derrida seems to define “fiduciary” money as bank notes and bank
checks but in international exchange the term refers to money backed
by reserve positions. Derrida’s awareness of such money may derive from
remarkable economic events during the decade when he was writing his
essay. Tracing deconstruction back to the 1970s is a common critical
gesture, but only in terms of politics; for example, Tobin Siebers sees it
as a product of cold war suspiciousness; Raman Selden, as the intellectual follow-up to ’60s radicalism; and Barbara Foley, as a development of
liberal pluralism.3 But consider as well the relevance for deconstruction
of the economic transformation that occurred in 1971, when all
currencies became fiduciary monies as the mechanisms of international
exchange dropped all reference to metals or other “specie.” Milton
Friedman describes the revolutionary nature of this change:
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Until 1971, departures from an international specie standard, at least by major
countries, took place infrequently and only at times of crisis. Fisher concluded in
1911 that “irredeemable paper money has almost invariably proved a curse to
the country employing it,”. . . The declining importance of the international
specie standard and its final termination in 1971 have changed the situation
drastically. “Irredeemable paper money” is no longer an expedient grasped at in
times of crisis; it is the normal state of affairs in countries at peace, facing no
domestic crises, political or economic, and with governments fully capable of
obtaining massive resources through explicit taxes. This is an unprecedented
situation. We are in unexplored terrain.4

The unexplored terrain that emerged in the 1970s is the world of
dematerialized currencies that Derrida believes has somehow transformed literature. Lifting the “curse” on irredeemable monies is tantamount to lifting the curse on signs that operate without reference, a
central element of Derrida’s linguistic project.
The economic transformation of money in 1971 is in peculiar ways
tied to the radical politics of the 1960s, as we can see by noting that in
France an important suspension of convertibility of the franc occurred
in May, 1968, in direct response to the threat of a General Strike. The
radical disruption of the social order that seemed to many linked to the
disruptions of deconstruction led to—or was countered by—the ending
of “reference” in that most fundamental “sign” in the capitalist system,
money. Jean Baudrillard recognizes a relationship between the new kind
of rebellion of the left in the 1960s, the demise of the gold standard, and
deconstruction, though his way of characterizing this complex relationship is to say that the development of an economic system based on what
he calls “uncontrollable play” marked the end of the possibility of
“materialist” contradictions, the end of the Marxist dialectic in which
changes in means of production generate changes in the social order, so
that a new form of resistance (to signs) was needed. He concludes that
at a certain point in history, production was “elevat[ed] . . . to a total
abstraction, . . . to the power of a code, which no longer even risks being
called into question by an abolished referent” (his emphasis).5 Then in a
footnote he explains that, “economically, this process culminates in the
virtual international autonomy of finance capital, in the uncontrollable
play of floating capital. Once currencies are extracted from all production cautions, and even from all reference to the gold standard, general
equivalence becomes the strategic place of manipulation. Real production is everywhere subordinated to it. This apogee of the system
corresponds to the triumph of the code” (129 n. 9).
Baudrillard’s comments suggest a peculiar relationship between
deconstruction, sixties’ radicalism, and the new definitions of money.
The end of the gold standard results in uncontrollable play of capital,
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which sounds like the freeplay that Derrida finds in language. In fact, if
we read the new “definition” of a currency, it seems very much like a
Derridean description of the endless “dissemination without return” of
linguistic signifiers—to define one sign is merely to put up other signs,
and so on, never reaching any end. The dollar is redefined so that it is
no longer a “silver certificate,” a paper referring to physical objects, but
rather simply a “federal reserve note,” a note indicating that the Federal
Reserve System owes the bearer a dollar. To have a dollar is to be owed
a dollar: the sign that represents money actually represents that one has
the right to another sign.
After the 1970s, the question of what backs up currencies is no longer
answered by an image of a huge stockpile of gold, but rather by a reserve
system; internationally, this takes the form of the International Monetary Fund, or IMF, in which countries hold “reserve positions” or
“s.d.r.’s,” “standard drawing rights”; they are granted rights to borrow,
and those rights back up their currencies. Internationally, a dollar is now
defined as a “basket” of so many marks plus so many yen, so many
pounds, so many of every currency—and similarly a mark is so many
dollars plus so many yen, and so on. Defining a currency in terms of a
basket of other currencies does rather seem like a system of freeplay of
signifiers: searching for the “meaning” of one monetary sign leads only
to an infinite sequence of other signs and ultimately circles back to the
same sign. Monetary signifiers are defined in terms of their differences
from other signifiers, not in terms of any signified.
Payment across countries is no longer even mythologized as the
transfer of objects; indeed payment in effect no longer exists at all;
rather, payment has become the transfer of debt from one country to
another. If being given an IOU is a way of deferring payment, the
current economic system has made such deferrals permanent. The
meaning of economic signs no longer derives from reference but rather
from a code.
Such changes in economics do not happen all at once and are never
complete and uniform across the entire field of economic activity. New
economic concepts emerge long before they become orthodoxy, and
sometimes such concepts appear first in non-economic texts, as ironic
mockery of common practices or descriptions of other social systems or
even just imaginary possibilities. In Given Time, Derrida in effect retraces
the long process of subtle changes in economic notions which led up to
the final dematerialization of money in 1971, by citing from texts
published near crucial moments in the history of the transformation of
money. Derrida focuses particularly on an ironic story by Baudelaire,
“The Counterfeit Coin,” published in 1864, and on an account of the
economics of “primitive” societies by Marcel Mauss, The Gift, published
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in 1925. Near each of these publication dates there was a significant
change in the way Western governments backed up the money they
issued, and elements in these texts reflect those changes. When Baudelaire
wrote his story about counterfeit money, there was considerable international anxiety about governments issuing money backed by nothing,
particularly the U.S. during the Civil War, which paid its troops with
“Greenbacks” that it printed quite freely. In reaction to this anxiety, the
official international gold standard was instituted in 1881. The gradual
dematerialization that Derrida wants to trace was the undoing of this
international treaty.
Baudelaire may not have paid much attention to international finance, but he was peculiarly sensitive to the issue of spending beyond
one’s means and going into debt, because early in his life he went
though his family fortune so rapidly that his relatives came together in
1844 and put his inheritance under their legal control so he could not
spend himself into serious debt.6 In effect, when he wrote the story
Derrida cites, Baudelaire was suffering under a personal version of the
policy that would become international law in 1881: a legal restriction
on the ability to spend beyond one’s means. Derrida reads into
Baudelaire’s comments about the possibility of wealth emerging from
the circulation of counterfeits a step towards the dematerialization of
money that would emerge in the twentieth century. Baudelaire was
certainly chafing under his inability to spend beyond his reserves, but to
say that he is simply exploring a new economic idea is to ignore the
irony of the story, which depends on the reader’s familiarity with the
nineteenth-century morality of spending only what one had earned.
Indeed, Baudelaire’s pleasure in telling the tale depends on the sense
that circulating a false coin would be considered an evil act, so that the
contemplation of the apparently lovely temporary results of such an act
could come under the rubric of Baudelaire’s general interest in the
“flowers of evil.” The story adopts an ironic stance towards circulating
counterfeits, but depends on the anxiety about dematerialization that
led to the official gold standard.
Derrida projects quite a bit of later economic history back onto this
story, including not only dematerialization but the transformation into a
consumerist economy which occurred from around 1880 to around
1920. The first thing Derrida focuses on in the story is that the scene is
set outside a tobacco shop. Derrida describes tobacco as “the object of
pure and luxurious consumption . . . an expenditure at a loss that
produces a pleasure . . . tobacco seems to open onto the scene of desire
beyond need” (GT 107). Baudelaire certainly admired lives devoted to
consumption, writing extensively about dandies, but he would have
thoroughly resisted the notion that such consumption could someday
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be the norm for everyone; indeed, much of the pleasure of contemplating the dandy is his difference from the average dull, thrifty, bourgeois
citizen.
The dandy becomes an important figure in social commentary and
literary circles at the end of the nineteenth century, but disappears from
discussion early in the twentieth, precisely as consumerism spreads to
becoming the basis of economic morality throughout all classes. Lawrence
Birken traces this transformation in economic history in terms rather
similar to Derrida’s: desire replaces need as the basis of economics.7 But
this transformation is not the move to some mysterious realm of
“luxurious consumption” as Derrida suggests; rather it is the move to
everyday consumerism. One small sign of the move from needs to
desires is a change in economic textbooks: in the nineteenth century,
every text began with production and with an account of the needs that
production hoped to satisfy; in the twentieth, every text begins with
demand, with desires.
The moment when consumerism finally replaced productivism as the
basis of economics is roughly the moment, 1925, when the other writer
Derrida highlights—Marcel Mauss—published his treatise, The Gift. The
1920s were a period of rapid transformation of economic morality in
which saving became much less important then spending, and the
average person gained for the first time the ability as a part of normal
life to spend more than savings—in other words, to go into debt. This
ability came about in reaction to the emergence of the automobile,
which led to radical changes in lending laws to allow average persons to
buy cars on time. To give a sense of this transformation, the economic
historian Martha Olney notes that before 1920, the average American
had twice as much in savings as in debt; by 1925, this ratio had been
reversed.8 In other words, 1925 marks the year when average Americans
began spending more than they had earned. A similar transformation
was occurring all over Europe.
What happened to consumer economics in the 1920s became economic orthodoxy in government policy in the 1930s when the Depression led to the worldwide acceptance of Keynesian policy. It was the
Keynesian revolution that eventually made “consumption the new
watchword,” according to economic historian Geoffrey Barraclough,
and it was Keynes who finally normalized the role of spending more
than earnings—deficit spending in governmental policy.9
Derrida presents Mauss’s gift economy in terms that connect it to the
economic transformations of the Keynesian era. Derrida quotes at
length a passage from Mauss in which Mauss seems to recognize that the
new governmental policies, such as Social Security, are steps towards the
kind of gift economy he advocates. The result of such policies, Mauss
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says, is that “we will rediscover motives for living and acting that are still
prevalent in many societies and classes: the joy of public giving; the
delight in generous expenditure on the arts; the pleasure in hospitality
and in private and public festival. Social security, the solicitude of the
mutuality, of the cooperative, of the professional group, of all those legal
entities upon which English law bestows the name of ‘Friendly Societies’—all are . . . better than the mean life afforded by the daily wage set
by management, and even better than capitalist saving” (quoted in GT
65). Mauss implies here that the gift economy which he found in
“primitive” social systems was also emerging in the early twentieth
century within capitalist society. Derrida describes Mauss as searching
for an alternative economics that is neither “capitalist mercantilism” nor
“Marxist communism” (GT 44).
Quite a few economists were searching in the 1920s and 30s for such
an alternative, including Keynes, John Hobson, and one C. H. Douglas,
who proposed what could be called an entirely “gift-based” economy.
Douglas called his system “Social Credit,” because he advocated replacing money entirely with credit given out by the government, but an
unusual kind of credit, because nobody needed to pay it back. He
wanted money to be recognized as a free gift from the government,
adjusted each year to keep ahead of production so that depressions could
not happen. Keynes acknowledged that Douglas was a major influence on
his deficit economics, and all the governmental programs such as Social
Security and WPA projects which followed upon Keynesian influences in
effect were modified versions of the move toward a gift economy.
Derrida highlights the centrality of credit in Mauss’s gift economy,
putting in italics Mauss’s statement that “the gift necessarily entails the
notion of credit” (GT 45). Derrida then goes on to make the remarkable
claim that credit has the same position in the economic system that
differánce has in linguistic systems. He says this in an account of
Aristotle’s distinction between chrematistics and economy. Chrematistics
is the system of monetary circulation, a system that Derrida says “has no
limit in principle. Economy, on the other hand, that is, management of
the oikos, of the home, the family, or the hearth, is limited to the goods
necessary to life” (GT 158).10 The distinction, Derrida says, depends on
the “limit between the supposed finiteness of need and the presumed
infinity of desire, the transcendence of need by desire” (GT 158). He
then writes this sentence: “As soon as there is monetary sign—and first
of all sign—that is, differánce and credit, the oikos is opened and cannot
dominate its limit.” Differánce and credit are presented here as two
essential features of signs that have the same result: they make it
impossible to maintain any limits or to have a closed system; they move
one from an economics ruled by needs to one ruled by desires. Derrida’s
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phrasing and his turn to Aristotle imply that credit has been a part of the
economic system about as long as there has been money, but I am trying to
show that in fact in Western nations credit only becomes a normal and
regular part of oikos, home or consumer economics, from the 1920s on,
bringing into everyday consciousness the notion of desires beyond needs.
After his detailed examination of the ways in which Mauss’s gift
economy and its notion of credit bears similarity to Derridean linguistic
structures, such as différance, Derrida’s argument takes a rather surprising turn: he goes on to argue that a gift economy could never exist,
because in such a world a gift-giver would be expecting a return, and so
would not be really giving gifts. To create a gift economy, Derrida says,
one has to imagine a “happy medium” between a “Shylock” and a
“monk” (GT 65). In claiming that the gift economy is impossible,
Derrida in effect moves beyond Mauss and the 1920s, joining the tide of
economic theory of the 1970s, the tide that overthrew the Keynesian
orthodoxy. Critics of Keynesian theory argue that Keynesian economics
is impossible in very much the same way that Derrida argues that the gift
economy is impossible. For example, Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent,
founders of the new Rational Expectations Economics, argue that
Keynesian policies of increasing government spending to counter
downturns in the economy are impossible because “countercyclical
policy must itself be unforeseeable by private agents . . . while at the
same time be systematically related to the state of the economy.
Effectiveness, then, rests on the inability of private agents to recognize
systematic patterns in monetary and fiscal policy.”11 In other words, the
excess money distributed by the government to counter business cycles
must seem an incalculable addition, “unforeseeable,” a pure gift. At the
same time, it must be “systematic,” in other words, carefully calculated
by government agents. The government has to then act like a Shylock,
cannily calculating returns, and at the same time appear to be a monk,
giving money away beyond all reason. Lucas and Sargent argue that
private agents would always see through the image of monkish generosity to the Shylockian calculation, and so would plan for what is supposed
to be unforeseeable generosity, destroying the gift-effect of deficit
spending. Derrida’s denial of the possibility of the gift economy parallels
anti-Keynesian economics of the 1970s, which characterizes deficit
spending as merely an illusory gift hiding a form of usury (GT 42).
Derrida’s argument against the possibility of a gift also ends up partly
repeating what Baudelaire’s narrator says in his story: the man giving
away a counterfeit coin to a beggar is trying to please both God and his
pocketbook, to give charity and calculate returns at the same time.
Edward K. Kaplan describes Baudelaire’s story as leading in itself to the
conclusion that “charity is impossible.”12 So one might think that
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Derrida, in saying that gift economies are impossible, is returning to the
1860s, not joining in the developments of the 1970s. Actually, the two
possibilities can coexist, because the economists who challenged Keynes
in the 1970s claimed to be returning to the economic theories of the
latter half of the nineteenth century, calling themselves Neoclassical
Economists.
Derrida’s arguments in Given Time come closest to those of one of the
most important anti-Keynesians, Milton Friedman. Friedman argues that
money plays an important role in the economy precisely because it is a
system for distributing signifiers which have no referent. He says that
money is “a social convention that owes its very existence to the mutual
acceptance of what from one point of view is a fiction.”13 Sounding very
much like a deconstructionist, Friedman goes on to say that money is a
“veil”: what it veils most is its own fictionality. Friedman criticizes
previous economic theories for believing that the fictionality of money
made it irrelevant, that one could always substitute the things actually
exchanged in any discussion of what money was doing. Instead, he
argues that changes in the sign system itself, in money, are some of the
most important determinants of economic events.
Friedman’s theories, though developed in the 1950s, remained secondary to Keynesian theories until the 1960s and ’70s, when the
fictionality of money became much more evident as the value—or the
“meaning”—of monetary signs began fluctuating daily under the influence of rampant inflation. Before the 1970s, certain countries, notably
France and the United States, maintained the appearance that monetary
signs represented physical realities by holding large quantities of gold to
back up monetary reference. Pictures of Fort Knox were circulated as
evidence of the backing of the dollar. After the 1970s, the U.S.
eliminated its rigid gold price and eliminated its national stockpile. The
fictionality of money became an important economic tenet of all
governments and a commonplace of newspaper headlines declaring the
latest inflation figures. I suggest that the economic developments that
made inflation a powerful political buzzword contributed to the plausibility of theories such as Derrida’s.
The policies which Friedman advocates bear similarity to some of
what Derrida explores in Given Time. Though Friedman accepts that
deficit spending—governmental gift-giving—is useless, he still has a way
to stimulate the economy: by steadily increasing the money supply
beyond the limits of what is involved in current exchanges. In other
words, he recommends that the government give money away without its
having been exchanged for anything, money not backed by anything, a
signifier without a signified, very much the same thing which fascinates
Derrida. Derrida interprets the counterfeit coin in Baudelaire’s story as
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the insertion of an excess sign into the economic system. He says that
the act of passing a counterfeit to a beggar is emblematic of “what can
happen to capital in a capital . . . in the age of value as monetary sign:
The circulation of the counterfeit money can engender, even for a ‘little
speculator,’ the real interest of a true wealth” (GT 124).
Friedman does not, of course, advocate circulation of counterfeit
money, but he does argue vehemently for the government taking very
much the role of the man giving away the counterfeit coin: the
government should keep expanding the money supply. The government
must keep creating fictions, money outside the system of exchange, in
order to cause real objects to appear. Monetarist economics uses the
circulation of money it has created from nothing to “engender real
wealth.” The results of an expanding money supply are almost magical:
“If any one bank receives an accession to its cash, it can therewith
acquire additional noncash assets equal at most to that accession. . . . yet
if all banks together receive an accession to cash, the banking system can
therewith acquire additional assets equal to a multiple of that accession.”14 Adding to the total supply has effects greater than the apparent
added amount of cash: an excess emerges as an effect of the code.
A crucial part of Friedman’s theory is the tenet that no person can or
should control the excess money added to the total. The process must
be completely automatic, never adjusted in reaction to economic events,
unlike Keynesian countercyclical stimuli. Friedman joins the Neoclassicists in arguing that economic policies cannot counter cyclical trends.
But one can have an automatic excess that keeps changing the money
supply in ways that produce a pressure to increase production (he says)
and therefore allows growth and keeps the economic engine running.
Derrida describes similarly the necessity of acts outside the circle of
exchange—those seemingly impossible gifts—as crucial to keeping the
economic engine going: “The overrunning of the circle by the gift, if
there is any, does not lead to a simple, ineffable, exteriority that would
be transcendental and without relation. It is this exteriority that sets the
circle going, it is this exteriority that puts the economy in motion” (GT
30). Putting the economy in motion—pressing the throttle of the
economic engine—is precisely what a constantly expanding money
supply is supposed to do.
The difference between the 1920s logic of Mauss, Douglas, and
Keynes that represents government as a gift-giver and the 1970s logic
(following Friedman) of automatic increases in the money supply is
reflected in intriguing ways in shifts in literature from the 1920s to the
1970s. Both economics and literature change from representing a world
in which some important persons can stand apart from the chaos of the
world and thereby create order to representing a world in which the
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system runs automatically, with no individuals shaping it. We can see the
literary transformation particularly well by examining writers who represent economic issues or practices in their aesthetic works. In the 1920s,
Ezra Pound and William Carlos Williams were followers of C. H. Douglas’s
Social Credit movement, and wrote long poems, The Cantos and Paterson,
that meditate on the notion of sovereignty, a notion that merges economic
and artistic authority.15 Pound’s Cantos trace a whole series of powerful
governmental leaders (Malatesta, John Adams, various Chinese emperors) who are evaluated in terms of their ability to control the system of
finance in their eras; as Pound puts it, “Sovereignty is in the right over
coinage.”16 The sovereign must be a genius who can adjust government
spending in ways that no one else can anticipate, and so can counter the
economic (and mental) cycles that threaten to lead to depressions. The
leaders in Pound’s poem appear strangely amoral—powerful, glorious,
manipulative, and yet generous; they are the combinations of Shylocks
and monks that Derrida says are necessary to run gift economies.
In Paterson, Williams repeats Pound’s credo that “sovereignty inheres
in the POWER to issue money.”17 His poem also investigates sovereignty
by creating enigmatic images of larger-than-life persons: it is based on
the conceit that the town of Paterson is somehow the same as a giant
man Paterson who is both thoroughly immoral and a potential sexual
source of rebirth for the hellish modern world. The poem cites several
tracts from followers of Douglas’s Social Credit movement, and reaches
a climactic demand that the government “[l]et credit / out” from its
entrapment in bad fiscal policies because credit is the “‘radiant gist,’
against all that scants our lives” (P 183, 186). When credit is “stalled in
money,” Williams writes, it “conceals the generative” and “thwarts art”;
credit as “gist” is thus a repressed energy, economic, sexual, and artistic,
which could erupt if only there were the right sovereign figures (P 18).
Williams also brings himself into the poem: he includes letters that
describe (and condemn) his treatment of lovers; and he repeatedly asks
himself how he or anyone can solve the poetic—and economic—
problems of the modern world. The modernist artist in Williams’s poem,
as in many early twentieth-century literary works, stands apart from the
rest of the world, becoming a figure similar to what Keynesian economics requires: someone who can perform acts which remain incomprehensible to everyone else in order to solve the problem of modern
chaos. In T. S. Eliot’s terms, the modernist uses art as a way “of ordering,
of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility
and anarchy which is contemporary history.”18 In giving shape to what
appears chaotic to everyone else, the artist enacts a model of sovereignty.
The rejection of the Keynesian model in the 1970s is basically the
rejection of active sovereignty, the rejection of a government that tries to
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counter the chaos of economic cycles or to create a new shape for
history. Anti-Keynesian economists argue, as we saw earlier in the
writings of Lucas and Sargent, that no one can act in a countercyclical
manner, because the system of cycles will always already have taken into
account any leaders’ efforts to counter the cycles. The only way that an
excess can be found, Friedman argues, is to make that excess as
automatic as the system itself. The notion of the impossibility of
individual transcendence of the market or the code is reflected in
postmodern arts of the 1960s and ’70s, whose “flatness or depthlessness,
a new kind of superficiality,” according to Fredric Jameson, makes it
seem that the “once-existing centered subject” that remained, however
enigmatically hidden, behind modernist works, “has today in the world
of organizational bureaucracy dissolved.”19
To give one striking example of the role of economics in postmodern
literature, consider The Crying of Lot 49, a novel about mysterious signs
appearing everywhere and the search for the meaning of them. No one
in the novel finds any understandable system of meaning; nonetheless,
the book manages to end, and what allows the search to end is one final
act: the signs are put on the market. The book ends with its title, with the
crying of a lot, the call for bids at an auction, and what is being put on
the auction block at the end is a collection of objects marked with the
signs everyone has been trying to understand. The novel thus finally
turns to the market in order to end its fiction: what stands outside
fictional signs and allows them to operate as signs is not reference or
meaning but a market for those signs. This is Friedman economics
exactly, letting the “meaning” of the most important signs derive from
the market, not from any conscious plans of supposedly sovereign
governments, corporations, or individuals.
Derrida’s texts are generally treated as emerging out of the worlds of
literature and philosophy, not economics. However, by reading back
from this essay to earlier ones, we can see that economics has always
played a role in Derrida’s linguistic analyses. Consider, for example, the
essay “Signature, Event, Context,” in which Derrida deconstructs the
nineteenth-century writer Condillac’s theory of meaning. Throughout
this essay, Derrida describes Condillac’s theory as one that sets “production” as the origin of meaning. Condillac’s theory is based on “the
simplicity of origin, the continuity of all derivation, of all production.”20
Similarly, Condillac believes that “to write is to produce a mark that will
constitute a sort of machine which is productive in turn” (S 8).
Derrida’s challenge to Condillac takes the form of a critique of
production. Derrida argues that the meaning or value of a sign does not
derive from its production: “The sign possesses the characteristic of
being readable even if the moment of its production is irretrievably lost”
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(S 9). Signs are then “the nonpresent remainder of a differential mark cut
off from its putative ‘production’ or origin” (S 10). This denial of the
importance of production as the source of “meaning” of signs may be a
philosophical position, but it seems also to be a corollary to the
transformation of the economic system from productivist to consumerist, that transformation which brought credit to seem the basis of the
economy. In his critique of Condillac, Derrida brings in several terms to
describe what replaces the moment of production as the source of
meaning, but in his follow-up article, “Limited, Inc.,” he says that there
is really just one structure, the “parasitic structure,” which he has “tried
to analyze everywhere, under the names of writing, mark, step, margin,
differánce, graft, undecidable, supplement, pharmakon, hymen, parergon,
etc.”21 In other words, parasitism, a form of borrowing and indebtedness, replaces production in Derrida’s theory, as it does in the economic
history of the twentieth century.
Derrida writes as if what he is doing is simply arguing with Condillac
in the ahistorical realm of philosophy, but I suggest rather that he is
looking back at the productivist economics of the nineteenth century
from the viewpoint of the consumerist economics of the twentieth, when
the theory that physical production is the central engine of the
economic system no longer holds. Derrida finds in theories of signs a
parallel to this economic transformation: production is no longer the
source of meaning of signs. Rather, a code produces meaning without
distinct acts of production: meanings are then like a stockpile of objects
waiting to be used.
Derridean attacks on the connection of meaning to intention or
production end up being interpreted as liberalizing gestures, freeing
people from the tyranny of the subject. But Derrida’s project hardly
produces images of freedom; rather the code takes over, creating its
automatic effects. Derrida focuses attention on one small sign of the
inability of individuals to control even their own possessions: they
cannot control their signatures. In Given Time, he lists “coded signatures” as one of the new forms of money. In “Signature, Event, Context,”
he presents his deconstruction of the notion of the uniqueness of
signatures: “to be readable, a signature must have a repeatable, iterable,
imitable form; it must be able to be detached from the present and
singular intention of its production” (S 20). Note that once again the
key to Derrida’s conclusion that signatures are separate from intentions
is that they are separated from production. Derrida’s deconstruction of
signatures marks one of the fundamental features of poststructuralist
discourse, the undoing of “subjects” as the originators and producers of
meaning. This alteration in the nature of subjects derives in part from
the rejection of production as the source of structural form and value.
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Without a fundamental concept of production, there is no “producer”
of signs, and hence writers lose their sovereignty over meaning. Nations
similarly lost their “sovereignty” over money as a result of 1970s
economics. When currencies are defined entirely by their relations to
other currencies (the market and the float), not by seeming reference to
objects, the notion of sovereignty changes. Robert Triffin, who proposed
the system of defining currencies in terms of baskets of other currencies,
describes the problem of deciding the “meaning” of monetary signs—
their worth—as precisely a problem of accepting a distinct reduction in
sovereignty:
In a world where countries have become more and more interdependent, [there
is an] enormous gap between the supranational nature of the problem with
which we dealt and the multiplicity of national currencies, coupled with
nationally determined policies which are often internationally incompatible. Yet
it is clearly impossible to change overnight these tribal or national systems with
which we have been living into a supranational system in which countries are
called upon to surrender their precious sovereignty. This is a problem we can
only solve gradually—through international, not supranational decisions. What
I would insist upon, however, is that in doing this we should not forget that the
problem itself is not a national one: it is an international problem.22

The “gap” that Triffin discovers is very much the kind of gap that
Derrida repeatedly focuses upon. There is a gap between the meaning of
a given monetary sign and the intended meaning that the sovereign
issuing nation would like to assign it. Currency gains some part of its
meaning or value from the international situation; a daily posting of
rates of exchange is like a constantly shifting dictionary. It is the crying
of the dollar every day, letting the market shape the code itself into a
constantly changing system. Pound’s and Williams’s belief in sovereignty
over coinage falls apart in the 1970s, as it becomes clear that there is no
sovereign powerful enough to control the meaning of money.
We could even adapt this economic model into an alternative interpretation of Derrida’s account of linguistic signs. Triffin’s account
suggests that to use a linguistic sign requires not merely an intention on
the part of the person using it, but a system of exchange—a market—
that determines how others will make use of the sign. One can “intend”
to use a word in a certain way, only to discover that people take the word
differently. Linguistic interactions are exchanges partly determining the
meanings that words carry, and hence shaping the models upon which
individuals build their utterances. The results of utterances shape the
“intentions” that go into further utterances; such results even shape
what a person thinks the intentions that supposedly preceded an
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utterance were. Triffin and Derrida both propose systems that would
result in the deconstruction of sovereignty.
In summary, then, I suggest we add to the list of disciplines that have
contributed to deconstruction. In Of Grammatology, Derrida credits
numerous fields, including philosophy (Nietzsche, Heidegger, and
Husserl), linguistics (Saussure), ethnography (Lévi-Strauss), and psychology (Freud).23 To this list, let’s add economics, citing Keynes, who
marks the end of production as the basis of economics, but who
maintains the belief that individuals in powerful enough positions can
still act to counter the effects of the system, and Friedman, who brings in
the notion that the sign system operates separate from any individual
agency. Historians of theory would probably prefer to cite Marcel Mauss
and George Bataille as the ones who led Derrida to the concepts of gifts
and of mysterious, uncontrollable economic structures. It is probably
true that they figure more consciously in Derrida’s own thinking than do
Keynes and Friedman. But the emergence of deconstruction and its
rapid spread during the 1970s are not merely events in the history of
highly intellectual disciplines; they are also events in the broader history
shaped by the changes in everyday economics and governmental practices. Keynes and Friedman developed theories which had material
consequences; Mauss and Bataille were in effect mythologizing the
events going on in mainstream economics.
Mauss and Bataille may seem better predecessors because they were
critics of capitalism, as Derrida is, but if mainstream twentieth-century
economic practices in effect involve the deconstruction of signs as an
everyday part of their functioning, then perhaps deconstruction should
not be considered inherently anti-capitalist or even anti-authoritarian.
Derridean theorists need to be careful when they generalize that a
deconstructive challenge to one form of authority (such as the authority
given to production as the source of economic value and the source of
linguistic meaning) carries with it a challenge to authority in other
realms, or even a challenge to the very idea of authority entirely. Derrida
makes such an unwarranted leap when he argues in his essay that the
power of a counterfeit coin to generate real wealth is equivalent to a
radical disruption of patriarchy: the power of the counterfeit coin in
Baudelaire’s story, Derrida claims, reveals that “the phantasm” has “the
power . . . of producing, of engendering, giving, rather than the ‘True
Father’” (GT 161). The image of a True Father, Derrida implies,
depends on theories of production and human giving as the basis of
prosperity, in other words, on outdated economic theories. In noting
that the phantasm, the sign, the code, has more power of “engendering”
and of “giving” than the True Father, Derrida might be tracing not the
demise of patriarchy but simply the demise of Keynesian economics and
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of the liberalism of the 1960s, the demise of the notion that the
government can wrap itself in the guise of the True Father and maintain
the economic system by appearing to give gifts whenever recession
threatens.
By describing the results of the economic transformations he has
traced as the end of patriarchy, Derrida’s theory implies much more
than has happened. The deconstructive revision of money into a system
of signifiers in endless freeplay may be a modification of capitalism, one
that capitalists and patriarchs opposed for centuries, but it turns out that
it is possible to perform such a deconstruction without undoing much of
capitalism or patriarchy at all—and Friedman did just that. Twentiethcentury economics reveals that non-logocentric sign systems can coexist
quite well with capitalism and can even play a crucial role in the
functioning of structures of authority, which apparently can operate
quite well without invoking any True Fathers at all.
Bryn Mawr College
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